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AN OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING MODEL
OF THE U. S. COPPER INDUSTRY:
A PROBABILITY MODEL APPROACH
The analysis of competitive industries and/or competitive sectors of
industries is theoretically and econometrically straightforward. Determinant
solutions occur at the intersection of supply and demand curves, where supply
curves represent the horizontal summation of the marginal cost curves of the
members of the industry (or sector thereof). Economic rents may accrue in
light of differential cost conditions across members. However, no member of
a competitive sector can affect price; they are all price-takers. Short-run
production decisions on the part of a given firm are made by comparing the
market price with production costs.
In oligopolistic markets, the micro theory no longer supports the use of
a supply curve. Deterministic market solutions, based upon costs (i.e., the
supply curve) and demand alone, are no longer possible. The reason is, of
course, that the members of an oligopolistic industry are no longer price-
takers; they are price-setters. An individual member or group of individuals
in an oligopolistic industry have pricing discretion. Costs, particularly
short-run variable costs, provide a reasonably solid lower bound to pricing
behavior; however, many factors can contribute to pricing behavior and pricing
strategies well above marginal cost.
The pricing behavior and pricing strategies that are utilized by an
oligopoly reflect the pecuniary and nonpecuniary objectives of the members
of the oligopoly and their ability to achieve those objectives, given the
conditions of the markets(s) in which they operate. In an unconstrained
world, it is probable that the members of an oligopoly would impose the
collusive monopolistic pricing solution with explicit collusive profits/sales
sharing agreements if necessary. In the constrained environment that faces
real world oligopolies, such short-run collusive profit-maximizing behavior
is constrained by the conditions of that market. For example, for an
1In a dynamic model, even this lower bound could be broken.
2
Witness the details of R. F. Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large
Companies," American Economic Review, December, 1958, pp. 921-940.
-2-
oligopoly characterized by mature price leadership, it will be easier for
the group to maintain pricing/production decisions near the collusive
monopolistic level in the face of tight demand and high capacity utilization
than under market conditions of slack demand and low operating rates,
ceteris paribus. This is merely George Stigler's "urgency of purchase"
effect upon the seller's ability to price discriminate. 1 Likewise, the
presence of government intervention (e.g., stockpiles of primary commodities,
vigorous antitrust action, environmental and health regulations) and dynamic
considerations (limit-pricing barriers to entry of new participants and/or
new products) will constrain the pricing/production decisions of the oligopoly.
For example, an oligopoly will have difficulty maintaining a collusive mono-
polistic price in the face of significant government sales from strategic
stockpiles and substantial entry (if the collusive price is above the limit
price). Finally, the number and size of the sellers, the number and size of
the buyers and their ability to collusively avoid price-shaving will affect
the pricing/production decisions of the oligopoly in ways explored thoroughly
by Stigler.
This paper discusses a model for analyzing the oligopolistic pricing
behavior of the U.S. primary producers of copper. While it can potentially
be extended to other oligopolies, I do not discuss its generalization here.
The model identifies a number of alternative pricing strategies available to
the U.S. copper industry, as a whole, in the short run. In the face of con-
siderable market share stability over the historical period (1950-1974),
long-term purchasing contracts, stable price leadership patterns and little
-evidence of price-shaving (at least through 1974), the inter-oligopoly pricing
issues pursued by Stigler2 have little relevance for the U.S. copper producers
over 1950-1974. As a result, the model developed here does not examine the
causal factors of price-shaving. On the contrary, the model attempts to
analyze the pricing behavior of the "price-led" U.S. primary producers of
See G. Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy,
February, 1964, Vol. LXXII, #1, pp. 44-61. These examples are elaborated
more thoroughly in Section B when the forces that constrain oligopoly pricing
are formalized into a probability model.
2
As Stigler states, "Fixing market shares is probably the most efficient of all
methods of combatting secret price reductions." See ibid, p. 46.
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copper, as a whole, and the market forces that help determine that group
pricing behavior. The model differs considerably from a competitive pricing
model in ways discussed in Section A.
The paper posits alternative pricing strategies. Given these pricing
strategies, the paper discusses how the constraining market forces operating
upon the U.S. primary producers of copper affect its actual pricing behavior.
The technique identifying the alternative pricing strategies has been developed
elsewhere1 and has been labelled a "parametric analysis." These "parametric"
pricing strategies are ex ante; actual ex post pricing behavior will depend
upon the ex ante pricing strategies considered, the desires of the oligopolists,
and the market forces constraining the ability of the oligopolists to implement
their desires. Utilizing the parametric analysis of alternative pricing options,
this paper endogenizes the oligopolistic pricing decisions by utilizing a
probability model to analyze the effects of market conditions upon the oligopo-
listic pricing decision.
The parametric analysis of oligopolistic pricing in the U.S. copper industry
is discussed in Section A below and compared with the competitive paradigm.
Some empirical results are presented supporting the oligopolistic pricing
model. The probability model formulation of oligopolistic pricing in the
face of market constraints is discussed in Section B. Section C presents some
further empirical results from the probability modelling. Some concluding
remarks are offered in Section D.
A. A PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY PRICING IN THE U.S. COPPER INDUSTRY
For means of comparison, let us briefly examine the pricing behavior
implied by the competitive model under conditions of perfect certainty. In
this case, the supply curve summarizes the horizontal summation of the marginal
cost curves of the participants in the industry and the intersection of that
supply curve with market demand yields instantaneous market equilibrium price
and quantity. If demand should shift, in this example, along the summation of
the marginal cost curves, the new equilibrium is instantaneously achieved by
1
See Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL), Economic Impact of Environmental Regulations
on the U.S. Copper Industry (August, 1976); and R. Hartman, An Oligopolistic
Pricing Model of the U.S. Copper Industry (M.I.T., Ph.D. Dissertation)
February, 1977.
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by the addition of new producers when demand shifts out or the elimination of
the marginal producers when demand shifts in. Demand is known with perfect
certainty and the market clearing price and quantity are known with certainty.
Needless to say, such a competitive, perfect certainty model is a textbook
case. The world is characterized by incomplete information and non-competitive
market structures. There has been a long tradition of models aimed at analyzing
price-setting behavior in non-competitive situations (many, unfortunately, deal
purely in the restrictive world of duopoly). Most of the theoretical literature
deals with profit maximizers acting under different (relatively rarefied)
behavioral assumptions. The mere assumption of profit maximizing behavior
per se flies in the face of much of the literature.l However, the theoretical
models cling tenaciously to such assumed behavior for a given producer.
The models combine it with behavioral assumptions directed at fellow
producers already in an industry (Bertrand, Cournot, Von Stackelberg) or directed
at outsiders who are potential entrants (Sylos-Labini, Bain, Modigliani and
2
Bhagwhati). The use of limit pricing to prevent entry has been developed
into dynamic programming models by Gaskins3 arid others.
In view of this brazenly short discussion of a very broad literature, it
should be clear that the number of possible short-run and long-run oligopolistic
pricing strategies is quite large. Given a wide range of assumed behavior and
corporate goals, possibilities for alternative pricing behavior abound. The
1
Witness Lanzillotti, op. cit.; Herman Simon, "Theories of Decision-Making in
Economics and Behavioral Science," American Economic Review, June, 1959,
pp. 253-283; W.J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth, 1959; Oliver
Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, 1964, Corporate Control
and Business Behavior, 1970, and "Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior,"
AER, December, 1963, pp. 1032-1057; Robin Morris, "A Model of the 'Managerial'
Enterprise," QJE, May, 1963; Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm,
Prentice-Hall, 1963; and so on.
For an excellent review of this literature plus references, see Paul Joskow,
"Firm Decision-Making Processes and Oligopoly Theory," American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1975, pp. 270-279.
3Darius Gaskins has also applied his thinking to the aluminum industry. See
"Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of Entry," Journal of
Economic Theory, March, 1971, pp. 306-322, and "Alcoa Revisited: The Welfare
Implications of a Secondhand Market," Journal of Economic Theory, July, 1974,
pp. 254-271.
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discussion here attempts to utilize more simplified short-run pricing
strategies and more simplified assumptions concerning the interactive
behavior of the members of the oligopoly. The interactive behavioral
assumptions implicit here are that a well-defined sub-group of the oli-
gopolists dominate price-setting activities (i.e., the oligopoly is
characterized by mature price leadership) and that relatively stable market-
share patterns characterize all members of the oligopoly over time.l
The pricing strategies or modes of pricing behavior utilized here are
chosen with two purposes: firstly, to identify a "most likely" or "normal"
pricing strategy of the U.S. primary copper producers in a given year, and
secondly, to identify reasonably solid bounds around that "most likely" or
"normal" pricing behavior. Three modes of ex ante pricing behavior have been
identified to accomplish these purposes.2 They include:
1. Collusive monopolistic pricing (MR = MC);
2. Full-cost pricing (P = ATC); and
3. Average variable cost pricing (P = AVC).
"Full-cost pricing" can be assumed to characterize the "normal" behavior
of some oligopolies in a normal year. By this formulation, price is set
equal to average total cost (ATC), where average total cost includes average
operating costs (i.e., average variable costs) plus average fixed costs
(which include a target or desired rate of return on investment). The desired
These assumptions will not be valid for all oligopolies. They are for the
primary producers of copper in the United States. See ADL, op. cit.;
Hartman, op. cit., for a full treatment of these issues and their effect
on the analysis.
2Certainly, many other ex ante solutions could be identified. For example,
alternative target rates of return could be built into the full-cost pricing
solution or P = MC could be identified. The identification of the full-cost
pricing solution as most likely or "normal" reflects the realities of the
U.S. copper industry rather than all oligopolies. The discussion is easily
generalizable by assuming all pricing strategies have unknown probabilities
and letting the probability model developed in Section B indicate which
solution is "most likely."
3
This seems to be true for the primary copper producers. For a discussion
and bibliography on "full-cost pricing," see Scherer, op. cit., Chapters
6 and 7; and Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomic Theory and Applications
(Norton, New York, 1971).
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or target rate of return on investment can be thought of as reflecting
competitive rental rates. The exact meaning of full-cost pricing shall
be clarified below.
The purpose of this paper is not to examine the validity of the full-
cost pricing hypothesis itself. The literature contains much support for a
2
number of variations of it. Hall and Hitch found that 30 of 38 firms used
some variant of it; Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzillotti3 found 10 of their 20
4
firms used some variant of it. Cyert, March and Moore were able to predict,
to the penny, the price of 188 of 197 randomly chosen items in a department
5
store using a simple wholesale cost mark-up rule. Scherer examines the
"full-cost pricing" tools of General Motors including "standard volume" and
"standard price." The use of full-cost pricing" and the "representative firm"
as a coordinating device for loose-knit cartels and oligopolies is examined in
varying contexts by Machlup, Scherer, Hall and Hitch, Cyert and March, Kaplan,
Dirlam, and Lanzillotti and Fog. Furthermore, Fog and Hall and Hitch7 have
examined how their full-cost pricing firms have broken away from the full-cost
price in the face of recessionary pressures.
1.-
For greater elucidation of the use of a target or desired rate of return, see
Lanzilotti, op. cit.; Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzilotti, Pricing in Big Business;
Scherer, op. cit., Chapters 6-9.
2
R. Hall and C. Hitch, "Price Theory and Business Behavior," Oxford Economic
Papers, May, 1939, pp. 12-45.
3
A. Kaplan, J. Dirlam and R. Lanzilotti, Pricing in Big Business (Washington:
Brookings, 1958), p. 130; and R. Lanzilotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large
Companies", American Economic Review (December, 1958), pp. 923 and 929.
See R. Cyert and J. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 146-147.
5F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1970), p. 174.
6See F. Machlup, The Economics of Sellers' Competition (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins- Press, 1952); F.M. Scherer, op. cit., pp. 173-179, 223-224, 290 and
305-306; Hall and Hitch, op. cit., pp. 27-28; Cyert and March, op. cit., p. 120;
Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzilotti, op. cit., p. 16; and B. Fog, "How are Cartel
Prices Determined," Journal of Industrial Economics (November, 1956), pp. 16-23
and Industrial Pricing Policies: An Analysis of Pricing Policies of Danish
Manufacturers (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1960).
7Hall and Hitch, op. cit.; Fog, op. cit.
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As a result, it can be stated that the "full-cost pricing" behavior
appears to characterize the pricing strategy of some oligopolistic firms in
"normal" years,l with "normal" demand/supply conditions. Furthermore, such
pricing behavior is the competitive solution for a market in long-run equili-
brium. However, administered pricing behavior will arise if an oligopoly can
maintain price above the full-cost pricing level or at the full-cost pricing
level in periods of slack demand.
There are, however, going to be short-run conditions that could deviate
the pricing strategy of an oligopoly from its full-cost-pricing strategy (if
that is its target). For example, for the U.S. primary producers of copper,
unforeseen factors, including some strikes, collapse of world demand, national-
ization of ore deposits, and/or overheating of world demand during the Viet-
namese War years, can impinge themselves upon pricing and production decisions
and prevent primary producers from realizing the "full-cost pricing" strategy.
These market and nonmarket conditions could make it feasible for the oligopoly
to raise prices to a collusive monopolistic pricing strategy; they could also
make it impossible for the oligopoly to avoid lowering prices below the
"full-cost pricing" target. To take account of the effects of these phenomena
in the short run, the "full-cost pricing" solution can be bounded by the
"average variable cost" pricing solution or strategy and the "collusive
monopolistic" pricing solution or strategy.
The lower bound on price in a given year has been identified as the
equality of price and average variable costs (AVC). At this point, the unit
price covers average operating costs alone without any fixed cost coverage.
While this lower bound reflects real short-run pricing options, a firm or group
of firms cannot price at this lower bound for long.
The short-run upper bound upon price identified for the analysis is the
"collusive monopolistic" point determined by the intersection of oligopoly's
As is the case with the primary producers of copper. For reasons, see ADL,
op. cit.; Hartman, op. cit.
As most certainly they will impinge upon the competitive sub-sectors of the
copper industry. However, since these sectors are competitive, discretionary
pricing decisions are not open to them in the first place.
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marginal cost and marginal revenue curves. In an unconstrained world of
robber barons, this might be the "normal, most likely" solution. In reality,
this is an upper bound only in the sense that perfect collusion exists, that
profit-sharing agreements are operative and work perfectly and that the
marginal cost curve fully articulates this collusive behavior.2
These three pricing options for an oligopoly are schematicized in Figure 1A
for the traditional U-shaped cost curves and in Figure lB3 for the horizontal
marginal cost (MC) curve case. Let us identify the three pricing options as
parametric solutions 1, 2 and 3. Clearly the parametric solutions 1 and 3
bound the "full-cost pricing" parametric solution 2. As seen in Figures 1A
and 1B, bounds exist for both price (P1 - P3) and quantity (Q3 - Q1) solutions.
The width of the bounds for the primary producers of copper in a given year is
determined by many things: the elasticity of demand, the elasticity of supply
in the competitive fringe sectors, the level of total copper demand, the
assumptions regarding the oligopolistic structure of the primary producers
as reflected in the shape and level of the cost curves for that group.
Using the facts of the U.S. copper industry and the cost curves of
Figure 1B, Figure 1C indicates the change in the bounds for parametric solu-
tion 2 in a year characterized by extreme demand pressures ("demand crunch").
Figure 1D examines the comparative statics in a year characterized by collapsed
demand ("demand slack"). As would be expected in a demand crunch case, the
primary producers would be pushing against capacity along the steeply rising
segments of the relevant cost curves (MC, ATC, AVC). In this case, all three
1
Such marginal cost curves are explained more fully in Figure 1 and Hartman,
op. cit., and ADL, op. cit.
2While the prices of the U.S. primary producers of copper move together, it is
not felt that such price leadership activity indicates "collusive monopolistic"
pricing. As a matter of fact, historical model results indicate that the
collusive monopolistic price solutions are considerably above the "full-cost
pricing" solution and the actual solution in most years. The exceptions are
a few years when upward shifts in demand appear to have bestowed considerable
market power (in a scarcity sense) upon the primary producers. Because of the
real limit-pricing concern about long-run substitution in demand to aluminum,
it was not expected that the primary producers would gravitate consistently to
a short-run collusive monopolistic price solution.
A familiarity with the representative of cost curves (ATC, AVC, MC) and demand
(DD) and marginal revenue curves (MR-MR) is assumed. The bemused reader should
consult Henderson and Quandt, op. cit., Chapter 3; or Edwin Mansfield, op. cit.
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price solutions rise while the bounds around parametric solution 2 narrow.
See Figure 1C. In slack demand situations, the primary producers will not
be pushed to capacity.l Price solutions for parametric solutions 2 and 3
will be lower, while the bounds around parametric solution 2 will widen
considerably. See Figure 1D. Figures 1C and 1D demonstrate principally the
effect of alternative demand levels rather than demand elasticity on the para-
metric solutions.2 However, such "demand slack" and "demand crunch" alternatives
do characterize the cyclical copper industry at different times during the
historical periods.3
An analysis of an oligopoly, in general, and the U.S. primary producers
of copper, in particular, must take its price-setting behavior explicitly into
account. The three pricing options introduced above are developed to analyze
explicitly that potential price-setting behavior. 4
1
Nor will the competitive fringe, secondary copper refiners and copper scrap
producers/sellers be pushed to capacity.
2
As drawn, the demand curve in Figure 1C is more elastic in the relevant range,
which also contributes to narrowing the parametric solution bounds.
3
The comparative statics of the model are examined more fully in Hartman,
op. cit., Chapter 4.
4The econometric simulation model for the U.S. copper industry discussed in
Hartman, op. cit., and ADL, op. cit., embeds these three parametric solutions
into a simulation of the domestic copper industry on a year-to-year basis. The
model simulates the entire copper'industry for each mode of price-setting be-
havior on the part of the oligopolistic primary producers. The "normal" mode
of pricing behavior on the part of the primary producers will generate model
solutions for all endogenous variables under "normal" conditions.
However, severe demand crunch (late 1960's, 1974) and demand slack (1975-1976) can
drive the primary sector and the industry toward non-"normal" strategies or solu-
tion bounds. The simulation model mentioned above will estimate those solution
bounds for the entire industry. For example, under severe demand crunch, para-
metric solution 1 (collusive monopolistic solution) could become relevant; the
primary producers are assumed to act in unison restricting output to that level
dictated by the intersection of their joint iR and MC curves (and raising price
accordingly). The model simulates how such pricing activity raises copper prices
generally, hence generating greater levels of production in the two competitive
sectors. On the other hand, in severe demand slack situations (1975), parametric
solution 3 may become relevant. For parametric solution 3 (price set at average
variable cost) in a given year, the model will indicate the production and pricing
behavior of the primary producers and how these pricing and production actions
will affect copper prices and production in the competitive sectors.
The detailed discussion of the model indicates these facets more clearly (see
sources above). Suffice it to say that the pricing behavior of the oligopolistic
primary refiners has important impacts upon the rest of the domestic copper indus-
try. As a result, the oligopolistic pricing model of the copper industry simulates
in a given year the entire industry for each mode of pricing behavior on the part
of the primary producers.
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However, the three parametric solutions are clearly ex ante. To make an
actual price/production forecast, one can identify the "most probable" para-
metric solution. As discussed above, the "full-cost pricing" mode of pricing
behavior characterizes some oligopolies in "normal" years. This is certainly
true for the primary copper producers. However, in years characterized by
extremely slack demand, it is likely the oligopoly will not be able to support
a price that includes a normal rate of return to investment.l In these cases,
the pricing/production decision will fall below the full-cost price level and
parametric solution 3 will represent the most probable pricing/production behavior.
Likewise, as discussed above, in years of extreme demand crunch, the parametric
bounds narrow and parametric solution 1 will be the "most probable" industry
simulation. In cases of extreme "demand crunch" and slack demand, parametric
solutions 1 and 3 may become the most probable solutions.
Just when parametric solutions 1, 2 or 3 become adequate approximations of
oligopoly pricing behavior is determined by market conditions. In an unconstrained
world, parametric solution 1 would always be chosen. In an uncertain world,
parametric solution 2 may represent the long-run profit maximizing solution.
In the real world the pricing strategy utilized by an oligopoly is determined
by goals of the oligopoly and the market forces constraining the oligopoly's
ability to affectuate those goals.
I shall turn, in Section B, to the formulation of a probability model which
will combine the three pricing strategies identified above with the market con-
ditions in which the U.S. primary copper producer oligopoly exists in order to
quantify how market conditions will, in actuality, affect oligopolistic pricing
decisions. Before doing that, however, let me emphasize the differences between
this pricing model and the competitive model.
1975 and 1976 being prime examples for the copper industry. Historically, the
dispersion of actual rates of return to gross book value of assets has been
quite large. Of course, the extent to which the oligopoly can maintain full-
cost pricing in slack years indicates the "strength" of the oligopoly.
2
General Motors use of full-cost pricing is to obtain "over a protracted period
of time a margin of profit which represents the highest attainable return
commensurate with capital turnover and the enjoyment of wholesale expansion with
adequate regard to the economic consequences of fluctuating volume." See
Donaldson Brown, "Pricing Policy in Relation to Financial Control," Management
and Administration (1924), p. 197.
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In the beginning of this section the discussion of the competitive, perfect
certainty model indicated price/production solutions occurred along the marginal
cost curves of the competitive producers in response to instantaneously per-
ceived shifts in demand. The three pricing strategies introduced above for
the U.S. primary producers of copper and the bounding of the oligopoly's
pricing/production decision within parametric solutions 1 and 3 imply that
the pricing/production solutions occur along the demand curve; just where they
occur depends upon the desires of the oligopoly and the ability of the oligopoly
to effectuate those desires in the face of constraining market forces. In a
world of uncertainty, the econometrically estimated demand curve facing the
oligopoly reflects the rational expectations demand and the knowledge of
oligopoly costs generates the three parametric pricing solutions. However, it
should be noticed that in Figures 1A through 1C that the full-cost pricing
solution and average variable cost pricing solution fall below the marginal
cost solution (the competitive case). If the oligopoly is covering its ATC1
and it desires to do so, then the fact that the full-cost pricing solution
falls below the marginal cost pricing solution is acceptable behaviorally.
The assumption that parametric solution 3 is realistic implies that in the
face of collapsed demand (which is the only time parametric solution 3 is
relevant) the oligopoly does not restrict output and try to price at marginal
cost. On the contrary, the oligopoly is assumed to attempt'to maximize revenues
and cover at least some of its fixed costs (until P = AVC along D).
Table 1 presents some limited results which suggest that the actual
pricing/production decisions of the U.S. primary producers of copper do lie
along the demand curve bounded by parametric solutions 1 and 3. These results
come from simulations utilizing the model discussed in footnote 4, page 8.
The actual solution is also given. These simulation results are derived from
relatively crude cost estimates for the primary producers over 1964-1973.1
1
A full understanding of the composition of the oligopoly cost curves would
be helpful in understanding what this P = ATC solution implies for the
members of the oligopoly. See ADL, op. cit., and Hartman, op. cit., Chapter 4.
2See ADL, op. cit., and Hartman, op. cit.
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In spite of the crude cost estimates, the results support the oligopolistic
pricing schema outlined here. In 1964, 1965, 1970 and 1972 the actual
price/production decision was between parametric solutions 2 and 3--below
the full-cost pricing levels along the demand curve. These years were
characterized by comparatively slack demand. In 1967 and 1968, the actual
solution is approximately at full-cost pricing levels. In 1973, the actual
solution is above parametric solution 2 between 1 and 2 along the demand curve.
In the three remaining years, the actual solution is ambiguous, however, none
of the ambiguous years suggest that marginal cost pricing was pursued.
B. A PROBABILITY MODEL FORMULATION OF THE PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS:
MARKET POWER AND ITS EFFECTS ON PRICING
Maximum Likelihood Formulation
The discussion above identified three ex ante pricing options, parametric
solutions 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 indicated how the actual pricing solution lay
between parametric solutions 1 and 3 over the time. Ignoring the actual
solution, consider the selection of the actual pricing option in a given year
to be a single drawing from a trinomial distribution F (X) = FX(X; P1 P2),
where
P1 for X = X1
P2 for X= X
F (X) = 2 2 (1)
P3 for X = X3
0 for otherwise
where X1, X2, and X3 are column vectors of the (price, quantity) solutions in
parametric solutions 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We have, therefore,
X PX 1 + P2X 2 + P3X3 = E(X) (la)
VARx = P 1(X1-X)(X7X)' + P2 (X2-X)XX2-'X) + P3(X3-X)(X3-X)'
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The likelihood function Lt for a given drawing in year t is given by
= n t n2 n3t
t it 2t 3t
iwhere Pt + t P3t = , nt + n2t + n3t = 1, and nit, n2t, n3 t can only
be 0 or 1.
To maximize Lt in a given year with respect to X we choose X = X such
that Pi = Max(Pj). 1
If we assume that the drawings each year are time-wise2 independent and
that (Plt P2t' P3t) can vary each year, the likelihood function of observing
over t = 1 . . . . T., a particular pattern of random drawings (i.e., pattern
of pricing regimes) is
T nitn2t n 3t
L L = n pt P 2tP (2)
t=1 t= it 2t 3t
= II P flp II P
tT it 2t T*3t
tETj tE7L2 tET3
where Pt + P2t + P3t = 1, for all -t; nit + n2t + n3t 1, for all t;
nit = 0 or 1 for all i and all t; Ti is the group of years t for which
nit = 1 (i.e., the years for which parametric solution i was chosen); and
TUT2UT 3 = T.
The Pit in equation 2 can be expressed in terms of variables expressing
market conditions so that Pit = Fi(BiZt), where Zt is a vector of variables
in year t and Bi is assumed constant over time. By specifying Pit = Fi(BiZt),
This is essentially how the model of choice operates in Hartman, op. cit.,
and ADL, op. cit.
2This is not a bad assumption when the ability to exert market power is
usually a short-run phenomenon (as is the case for the copper industry)
reflecting short-run shifts in demand and sudden scarcities; witness, for
example, the copper industry in 1974 and 1975. The probability that
solution 1 was chosen in 1974 is high; the probability that solution 3 was
imposed in 1975 is high; and finally, the imposition of solution 3 in 1975
depended entirely upon events in 1975, not upon the choice in 1974.
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and utilizing equation 2, maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of B. can be
obtained. Utilizing these estimates of B and F will yield MLE ~it for all
i and t. As a result, the effects of Z upon the Pi can be quantified.
Furthermore, Pit can be utilized in equations la), yielding a single endo-
genous solution Xt with VARX . The functional forms Fi and Zt are developed
below. t
The Functional Determination of the Probabilities (P ):
Definition of Market Power t-
It has been indicated in Section A that for some oligopolies, parametric
solution 2 can be the normal, "most probable" long-run competitive equilibrium
solution. Parametric solutions 1 and 3 bound that solution. However, which
solution best approximates ex post the pricing behavior of an oligopoly in
a given year depends upon market conditions and constraints upon the ability
of the oligopoly to exert market power.
The following discussion develops for the U.S. primary producers of copper,
a continuous variable expressing the market power for oligopolists. This
market power variable will be utilized for determining the probabilities
(Pit) introduced above. However, before plunging into that specific analysis,
some general comments are in order. The discussion in Section A indicated
that in "demand crunch" periods, the collusive monopolistic solution (MC=MR)
becomes a real possibility. Likewise, in "demand slack" periods, parametric
solution 3 (P=AVC) becomes probable. Such qualitative statements merely imply
that as demand shifts suddenly and robustly upwards in the short run against
fixed capacity, the sudden excess demand yields high capacity utilization
rates and greater market power to raise prices to desired levels. As mentioned
in the introduction, this is merely Stigler's "urgency of purchase phenomenon.
Likewise, sudden and significant decreases in demand, given fixed capacity,
generate low capacity utilization, stockpiling of inventories, and decreased
market power (i.e., ability to maintain price at desired full-cost pricing
levels).
G. Stigler, op. cit.
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While such statements hold generally for an oligopoly, the extent to which each
factor is important in determining the market power of an oligopoly differs
from oligopoly to oligopoly and may differ for a given oligopoly over time.
The ability of a given'oligopoly to take advantage of market power and im-
pose pricing regime 1 depends upon such factors as: the number of participants
in the oligopoly, the stability and "maturity" of the oligopoly with respect to
*price leadership and following roles, the relationship of the collusive monopolis-
tic price to perceived limit prices, the discount rate of the oligopolists, the
elasticity of supply in competitive fringe sectors, the expected impact of
federal regulations upon the current and future state of the industry, the
presence of anti-trust measures, etc.
These insights can be made more specific for the copper industry. Prolonged
periods of demand crunch in the 1960's were characterized by prices above full
cost pricing levels; however, they were still well below collusive monopolistic
price solutions.3 The constraints upon market power (i.e., pricing) appear to
have included the real concern about long run substitution from aluminum, (a limit
pricing argument) the fact that the vertically-integrated oligopolistic primary
producers were capable of obtaining a good portion of the short-run monopoly
profits through market power at the semi-fabricating and fabricating stages of
production, and the use of the copper stockpiles by the federal government.
By 1974, however, some concerns about long run substitution in demand from'alum-
inum were diminished because aluminum had indeed captured some of the markets
where substitution had been feared. As a result, in the face of a sudden and
great increase in demand, the primary producers did appear to price at para-
1The relevance of these considerations is made clearer in Hartman, op. cit.,
Chapter 4, Section Aix.
2For example, if Environmental Protection Agency legislation is expected to
limit domestic copper capacity, domestic producers may raise prices until foreign
supply expands enough to compete through sizable levels of imports.
These insights are based upon historical simulation of the copper industry
utilizing the model discussed in Hartman, op. cit. See Appendix B of that dis-
cussion for a presentation of historical simulation results.
4This is David McNicols' insight. See D. McNicol, "The Two-Price System in the
Copper Industry." MIT PhD dissertation, (February, 1973).
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metric solution 1. Furthermore, the government stockpiles of copper, utilized
to exert downward pressure on copper prices in the 1960's, were effectively
exhausted by 1972; hence, they did not provide a constraining force in 1974.1
To summarize such insights for the copper industry, we may say that although
significant shifts against fixed capacity may be necessary to generate market
power, constraining influences may limit its use. However, high and suddenly
increasing demand in the face of low government stockpiles has seemed to
generate the unconstrained market power necessary for the primary producers
to impose discretionary pricing option 1.
In a more general equational form we have:
MPt = G(CPUt, DEMANDt, INVENTORIESt, LIMIT PRICEt, INSTITUTIONAL (3)
FACTORS t)
where MPt is the level of market power experienced in year t by the oligopoly.
It is hypothesized in (3) to be a function of five factors.. CPUt is the capa-
city utilization rate for the oligopolists; it summarizes the interaction of
demand, capacity expansion and the cost curves of the oligopolists in year t;
it is assumed G1 > 0. DEMAND is the measure of the robustness of demand
increases in a given year t; it can be proxied for copper by the level or the
changes in world copper prices (ARPLME), in U.S. industrial production (AYUD),
or in primary producers production/sales (AQPR). It is expected that G2>0.
The presence of inventories will constrain the ability of the oligopoly to
effectuate demand crunch conditions into market power and price increases.
While the determination of inventory behavior is complicated in itself,
involving a combination of buffer stock and speculative motives2 and, while
its effect requires some formulation of the costs of holding inventories,
it can be safely assumed that G3<0. Clearly, the ability to translate
market conditions into market power and higher prices depends upon the
height of the limit price; hence G4>0. Finally, a range of institutional
issues will determine the extent that current market conditions can be
translated into market power. For example, imposition of import quotas will
.
1 See Hartman, op. cit.; ADL, op. cit.; Charles River Associates (CRA), Economic
Analysis of the U.S. Copper Industry (March. 1970).
2For a discussion of inventory modeling for the primary producers of copper,
see Hartman, op. cit.
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increase market power, ceteris paribus. The elimination of import quotas
will lower market power ceteris paribus. The formation of a cabinet committee
such as the Houthakker Committee for the analysis of copper will diminish mar-
ket power. Government stockpiling policies will affect market power. Clearly,
the effect will depend upon the particular institutional arrangement; if we are
to believe the Stigler "capture" theory of regulation and government interven-
tion, then G5>0. If on the other hand, the populist, antagonistic relationship
between government institutions and a given oligopoly holds, we expect G5<0.
The initial specifications for the copper industry can take the
following forms:
MPt = G (CPUt, ARPLMEt, INVt, GOVt) (4a)
MP t = G2(CPUt, AYUDt, INVt, GOV ) (4b)
MPt = G3(CPUt, AQPRt, INVt, GOVt) (4c)
where MP is the level of market power in year t
t
CPUt is the capacity utilization rate at the full-cost pricing solu-
tion for year t
ARPLMEt, AYUDt, are changes in world copper prices, and the index of
U.S. industrial production over t-l to t (levels of YUD are also used).
AQPRt is the proportional change in physical primary producers'
production for parametric solution 2 from year t-l to t.
INV is the level of final product inventories of the primary producers
t
at the beginning of year t.
GOVt is the level of government stockpiles of copper at the beginning
of year t.
Equation 4b) will be used in Section C.
Final Statement of the Likelihood Function
Before turning to estimation, it is necessary to link the market power variables
to the probabilities of selecting parametric solutions 1, 2 or 3. It is clear
from the discussion above that Plt /MPt>0 while P3t/aMPt<O. Therefore, we
have
lt Fl(mPt), aF1/MPt>0
P3t= F3(l4Pt), aF3/ MPt<
and P2t=-F(MP) - F3(MPt ) = F2(MPt)
-17-
Let us furthermore define the Fi to be the logit specification. As seen above,
we assume that Xt is a multinomial random variable described by 3 probabilities
Pr(Xt =Xit) = Pit
3
where Z Pit = 1 and 0<Pit<1, for all i and t.
i= it
Using the logit specification, we obtain:
Pr(X=Xit) =it i (MPt ) (6)
. e (MPt)
j=l
Using linear versions of the equational specifications of MPt in (4b), we may
specify equation 6 for i = 1, 2 and 3 by determining the ci(MPt) as follows:
*1 (MPt cYt a CPUt + 2 YUDt + a3INVt + a4 GOVt (7a)
= t = B CPU + B2 AYUDt + aINV + 4GOVt (7b)3 (MPt) syt a1CP + 2 Yt 3 t 4 ,t
2 2 (7c)
2(MPt) = YZt = Y(CPUt-CPU)2 + y2(AYUDt - YUD + Y3(INVt - INV)
+ 4(GOVt-GOV)2
As a result 6 becomes for i = 1, 2 and 3:
"aY
e t
Plt ayt + eyt + eYZt (8a)pl= etY e Yt YZt
YZ
P (8b)
2t et Y+ e Yt + e YZt
e
B Y
.t
P (8c)3t + eYt + eYZt
z 2 2
where Yt = (CPUt, AYUDt, INVt, GOVt)', Zt = ((CPUt CPU) , (AYUD - AYUD)2
(INVt-INV)2 , (GOVt-GOV)2) 
and where the elements of Yt are defined above with equation (4). Clearly,
Zt is a vector of the squares of the difference of the variables in Y from their
means.
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The forms of equation 8 deserve some comment. Clearly, it is expected that
BPlt/aMPt>0 and P3t/aMPt<0. As a result and in light of the discussion pre-
ceding equation 4,my priors in 8a) are: a 1>0 (increased capacity utilization
rates increase market power and the probability of effecting collusive monopo-
listic pricing); ac2>0 (the greater the short run increase in demand(4YUD)
the greater the market power, etc.); a3<0 (the greater the "overhang"
of inventories, the less the market power and the probability of effecting
collusive monopolistic prices); 4<0 (the greater the overhang of government
stockpiles, the less the market power etc.). In equation 8c) the priors are
reversed; increased market power decreases the probability that the oligopoly
is forced to average variable cost pricing. Hence, I believe that 1'<O,
a2<0, 3>0, B4>0.
Equation 8b) expresses the nonlinear relationship of P2t to market power (MPt).
As market power increases above "normal" levels, or decreases below "normal"
levels, P2t declines. Only when market power is near "normal." levels, will
the normal full cost pricing solution occur. I have specified this diver-
gence from "normality" as the squared differences from the mean (over the
sample period) of the constitutent variables in Yt. The priors for 8b) are
Y1, Y2, Y3 ' Y4
< 0; as market power diverges from normal levels, P2t declines.
The form of equations 8a-8c is identical to that of
aY + a'Z
e t t
Plt re j (Yt' Zt) (9a)
e'Yt + YZt (9b)
2t .Zej(Yt' Zt)
eYt + 'Zt (9c)
P3t ZeNj(Yt, Zt)
where ', y', ' are constrained to be zero. Equations 9a-9c are the general
multinomial logit formulation.
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Likelihood techniques are used here and utilizing equations 8a-8c the likeli-
hood function 2 becomes:
L = I Lt = Plt 2t 3t eYtt=l tETi tT2 teT teT ay +1 2 3 tie t+e t+e t (10a)
TI eYZt
tET2 e Yt + e t +eYZt
TI eBYt
tCT3 e t+e t + eYZt
subject to the same constraints.
The more generalized formulation resulting from not imposing the con-
straints on a', ' and y' (i.e., using equations 9a-9c) is
aYt + a'Zt
L. . P P it P = 
tCT1 it teT2 2t toT 3 3t tT Y + a'z Yt + 'Z y'Y YZtt t t t t t1 e +e +e
Y'Y + YZt t
tT 2 aY + a'Zt Yt + 'Zt y'Y + yZ
e +e + lob)
tcT 3 Yt
.+ 'Zt
e 
BYt + BZ te
SY + 'Z t y'Y + Z
t 't t t
-e +e
This section has formally equated market power with the probability that
an oligopoly (the U.S. primary producers of copper) can impose desired pricing
regimes upon the domestic market in the face of constraining market conditions
and government response (through strategic stockpiles of copper).
The estimation of the parameters of 10a or 10b will indicate how market
conditions, inventory positions, and governmental action affect the market
power of an oligopoly by affecting its ability to impose those alternative
pricing regimes (1, 2 and 3).
II
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C. SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The technique utilized to estimate the model parameters translates the
generalized multinomial logit formulation of Section B into the usual choice
problem.l The reader interested in the details of the maximum likelihood
technique should consult the relevant documentation.2 The technique utilizes
the convexity of the conditional logit function to converge quickly through
a Newton-Raphson algorithm if a maximum exists.3 The existence of the maximum
is virtually certain in samples of more than 10-20 observations.4 However,
as discussed below, the need for 10-20 observations generated convergence
difficulties given the limited size of my sample.
Equation 10b is the likelihood function initially utilized. The purpose
of estimating the general likelihood function is to test the hypothesized
constraints: a' = i' = y' = 0.
The parameters of the system 9a-9c are identified to a normalization.
The program utilized for the estimation normalizes one set of coefficients--
(a, a'), (B, B') or (y', y)--to zero. I have normalized (a, a') to zero.5
The data is detailed in Table 2. The variables have been defined in
Section B; they are redefined in the notes to Table 2. Since the variables
in the Table were fundamental to a more detailed analysis of the U.S. copper
industry, they are discussed in greater length in the sources mentioned above.6
Y2t' the level of U.S. industrial production in year t, and Y4t the level of
government stockpiles of copper at the beginning of year t are treated as
exogenous in that analysis. The level of final product inventories at the
beginning of year , Y3t' is a predetermined variable for year t. The capacity
1For an analysis of the choice problem see T. Domencich and D. McFadden, Urban
Travel Demand, A Behavioral Analysis (North Holland/American Elsevier, 1976).
2The computer program utilized has been developed by C. F. Manski. See "The
Conditional/Polytomous Logit Program: Instructions for Use," an unpublished
mimeo (Carnegie-Mellon University, 1974). For a greater discussion of the
choice problem, see T. Domencich and D. McFadden, op. cit.
3Manski, op. cit.
Domencich and McFadden, op. cit., p. 111.
5
See Manski, op. cit., Domencich and McFadden, op. cit., and Nerlove and Press,
op. cit. The normalization does not matter; I have chosen (a, a') because
P1 = 1 only once. See Table 1.
To wit, ADL, op. cit., and Hartman, op. cit.
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utilization rate for the full-cost pricing solution for year t, Ylt, is an
endogenous variable determined by demand, production capacity and costs of
the price setting oligopoly (the primary copper producers) in year t.
Z1 - Z4 are defined in terms of Y1 - Y4 and their means.
The discussion of this paper has referred specifically to analyses of
the U.S. copper industry. The Pit are determined by the historical simulation
results of those analyses.1 Pit = 1 or 0 is determined by observing the
squared prediction error for parametric solutions 1, 2 and 3 from the actual
historical values. Pit = 1 when the sum of the squared prediction errors for
all endogenous variables in parametric solution i were smallest for year t..
Th t s -li ~A 2
it Pit i when kl (Yjkt Ykt ) is minimized for j = i,
where Yjkt is the predicted value of endogenous variable k in year t under
parametric solution . Ykt is the actual value of endogenous variable k in
year t. As seen in Table 2, parametric solution 1 provided, the best estimate
of the actual variables in 1974; the full-cost pricing parametric solution 2
provided the best estimate in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1972 and 1973; and parametric
solution 3 (P = AVC) provided the best estimate in 1964-1966, 1970, 1971 and 1975.
Clearly, the assignment of probabilities in this fashion is arbitrary. It
implies that in the year * when Pit = 1, parametric solution i provides the
best central tendency for prediction. It is equally true the actual solution
could be in the tail of parametric solutions j, j i. However, the purpose
of this effort is to indicate how market forces constrain and affect oligopoly
pricing. The arbitrary assignment of probabilities in this fashion merely
positions the actual solution along the continuum of solutions between para-
metric solutions 1 and 3. The functional relationship of that position to
constraining market conditions will indicate how those constraints affect
market power, i.e., the probability of imposing desired pricing/production
strategies.
1
Hartman, op. cit., and ADL, op. cit.
2
In the full model of the U.S. copper industry the endogenous variables
include five demands for refined copper, three sources and four price
variables. See Hartman, op. cit., and ADL, op. cit.
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The data in Table 2, particularly the Pit resulted from detailed
historical simulation of the U.S. copper industry that drew heavily from
engineering cost estimates for the primary producers across four stages of
production over the 12 yearsj1964-1975. As a result, it would require much
effort to expand the sample in Table 2 if accurate estimates of the Pit and Ylt
were sought for earlier years. This is mentioned because the 12 observations
for 1964-1975 restricted the empirical analysis as is discussed below.
After normalization, initial attempts to estimate the 16 parameters
B, 8', y' and Y were nonconvergent. The sample is just not large enough to
support estimation.l Restricting y' ' = 0 and estimating and Y led to
convergent estimates which are given in Table 3. However, given the small
sample size for estimating eight parameters, the variances of the estimates
are extremely large in equation Al. None of the parameters are significantly
different from zero; however, one can reject H: all parameters = 0 (see below).
The signs of B1i B2', 3 and 4 are all as hypothesized. As market power
increases with higher capacity utilization rates (Y1) and higher levels of
demand (Y2 ), the probability declines that parametric solution 3 (P = AVC)
will be imposed (i.e., 1< 0, 82< 0). Likewise, the greater are the overhangs
of private sector copper stockpiles (Y3 ) and government stockpiles (Y4), the
smaller will be the market power of the primary producers and they will be
less capable of imposing parametric solutions 1 or 2 (3> O, 84> 0).
It was hypothesized in Section B that YI, 2 Y3 and y4 are all less
than zero. In Table 2 only Y4 < 0; however, Y1, y2 and y3 are not significantly
different from zero. Such evidence may suggest that it is either inappropriate
to relate the probability of imposing the full-cost pricing regime to squared
deviations of Y1 - Y4 from sample means or that the sample size is too small.
The inappropriateness of the Zi seems to be particularly true for Y2 which
increases relatively monotonically.
Table 3A presents several other sets of results with combinations of.the
Si and Y1 - Y3 constrained to be zero. Also presented in ColumrsB are results
when absolute changes (AYUD) in the index of industrial production are utilized
for Y2' As can be seen, as the number of estimated parameters is reduced,
1The problem is numerical. With such a small sample, the Hessian becomes
singular preventing the use of the Newton-Raphson algorithm;
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the significance of estimates rise.. Furthermore, in the logit formulation,
the Newton-Raphson estimation process is-sensitive to multicollinearity; this
sensitivity becomes severe in small samples. In the sample Y and Y2 are
collinear given the fact that they both attempt to represent market conditions
in each year. Equations A3-A5 document parameter estimates suppressing one
market condition variable (Y1 or Y2) and one inventory overhang variable
(Y4 is used). Furthermore, elements of Y1 - Y3 are suppressed. As a result,
the variances of the parameter estimates in equations A3-A5 are lowered
considerably. Again, the estimates for l and 2 in A3-A5 indicate that
conditions of excess demand (Stigler's "urgency of purchase") decrease the
probability that the oligopoly will price at AVC. The presence of government
stockpiles decrease the market power of the oligopoly and increase the
probability that the AVC solution obtains. Likewise, as government stockpiles
diverge from "normal levels" the probability parametric solution 2 will obtain
are decreased. In words, as government stockpiles are above (below) normal,
the probability that average variable cost pricing (collusive monopolistic
pricing) will obtain increases.
In Table 3B, where changes in demand (AYUD) are used to proxy market
conditions rather than levels of demand (i.e., YUD), the significance of
B2 and 84 are near the 90% level. Again when equations B are estimated with
both 81 and 82' the data is too collinear to obtain convergence.
For all equations in Table 3 a likelihood ratio test for H0: all para-
meters = 0 can be rejected consistently at levels around 90% and sometimes
above 95%.
It should be noticed in Table 2 that historical simulation suggests para-
metric solution 1 was obtained only once, in 1974. Of course, we could treat
the actual solution for 1974 as being in the tail of parametric solution 2. In
that case, all solution values can be conceived of as being either full-cost pricing
(parametric solution 2) or average variable cost pricing (parametric solution 3).
As a result, we have a binary logit model where the probability that parametric
solution 2 is imposed is a positive function of market power (i.e., P2/¥lY> 0;
aP2/aY2 > 0; aP2/aY3< 0; aP2/aY < 0) and the probability that parametric
solution 3 is imposed is a negative function of market power (i.e., DP3/Y1 < O;
3/a aP3 /Y2 >< O; aP3/Y3  P /y 4 > ).
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This reinterpretation implies that as the market power of the oligopoly
increases, it can obtain its full targeted rate of return P = ATC and sometimes
more (in 1974). Likewise, as market power declines, the oligopoly has less
power to maintain its targeted rate of return and P = AVC becomes the pricing -
regime forced on it by market conditions and inventory positions (private
sector stocks and particularly strategic government stockpiles). This reinter-
pretation also reduces the number of parameters to be estimated.
The results of the binary logit treatment in Table 4 agree with those in
Table 3; however, the standard errors and t statistics for (Ho: parameter = 0)
are more respectable. Again in this case, Y1 and Y2, where Y2 is changes in
industrial production, are too collinear to permit convergent estimates for
B1 and 2 together. However, since 1 and B2 are both proxying the same1 2 1 2 1
phenomenon, estimates of a differentiated effect is unnecessary.
In equations 1 and 2 we see that B1 = P3/1 < and 3 = P3/ Y3 and
84 = aP3/aY4 are greater than zero. Hence, for the binary case, P2/ Y1> 0
and aP2/aY3 and P2/aY4 are less than zero. In equations 3 and 4 we see that
aP3 /ay2< 0 and P3/ay4> while P2//Y2> 0 and aP2/aY4< O. H0: all parameters
= 0 can be rejected at acceptable levels; in equations 3 and 4 it can be
rejected above 95%.
D. CONCLUSION AND ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS
The discussion in Section A indicated that while movements along a supply
curve (the horizontal summation of marginal cost) provide a useful summary of
pricing and production decisions/behavior in a workably competitive sector or
industry, they are not useful for an oligopoly. The reason is that not only
costs but also the discretionary pricing decisions of the oligopolists must
be analyzed. An alternative model based upon common oligopoly costs and
movements along the expected demand curve was posited. To that end, Section A
introduced three potential pricing/production strategies or regimes along the
demand curve for an oligopoly: MR=MC, P=ATC; and P=AVC.
See Domencich and McFadden, op. cit., Chapter 5.
2Of course, other parametric solutions can be specified such as P=MC. They
can be estimated and included in a probability model formulation.
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The ability for a group of oligopolists to impose a pricing/production
strategy will be restricted by its -market power. While an oligopoly would
like to impose MR=MC and may be satisfied with P=ATC, there will be times when
market conditions may force that oligopoly to P=AVC. The market power (ability
to impose desired prices) is described in Section B to be determined by market
conditions (excess demand, high capacity utilization vs. excess supply, low
capacity utilization), inventory "overhangs," government actions (anti-trust,
stockpiling activities) and limit pricing considerations, to name a few. To
ease empirical work, three factors were identified: market conditions as
proxied by levels and changes in demand (index of industrial production) and
by capacity utilization rates, stockpiles of inventories held by producers and
users of copper, and strategic government stockpiles of copper.
In Section C it was found that the probability of the occurrence of a
parametric solution, or the market power of the oligopolists to impose a
particular pricing/production strategy, was indeed related to market conditions.
The results indicate particularly how market conditions and government stock-
piling affect the copper oligopolies' pricing/production policies. For
example, as market power increased due to excess demand and high capacity
utilization, the probability decreased that the oligopoly would be forced
to P=AVC, while the probability increased that P=ATC (Table 4) or that MR=MC
or P=ATC (Table 3). Likewise, when strategic government stockpiles were low,
market power increased with the same probabilistic effects: the oligopoly
could impose P=ATC or MR=MC (Table 3) or P=ATC (Table 4). On the other hand,
when market power declined due to market conditions and government stockpiling
activities, the probability that the oligopoly would be forced to price at
average variable cost increased.
These results differ crucially from a competitive model because they
suggest that the oligopoly's pricing/production decisions are not summarized
by movements along the supply (marginal cost) curve. On the contrary, the
oligopoly's pricing/production decisions lie along the oligopoly demand
curve (Table 1). Where along that demand curve they occur depends upon the
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costs of the oligopoly (hence, parametric solutions 1, 2 and 3), the
pricing/production targets of the oligopoly, and crucially upon the ability
of the oligopoly to effectuate those goals (as parametrized by the estimates
in Tables 3 and 4).
Given the fact (in Table 2) that parametric solution 1 seldom provides
a reasonable approximation of the primary copper producers' pricing/production
decisions, let us utilize the binary strategy case in Table 4, equation 1, to
give some economic interpretation to the discussion. Recall that in the binary
strategy case, the full-cost pricing and average variable cost pricing strategy
are utilized to bound the pricing/production decisions of the oligopoly. In
Table 5 the binary pricing/production strategies are full-cost pricing (P2)
and average variable cost pricing (P3). Clearly, the primary producers' desire
to impose the full-cost pricing strategy in all years, in the binary case.
However, their ability to effectuate those desires is constrained by market
conditions. The market power (i.e., the probability of imposing the desired
pricing/production strategy) increases from P2 = 49% when market variables
(capacity utilization, primary producer stocks and government stockpiles) are
at their mean levels. If we were to take an expectation of the pricing/production
levels utilizing P2 and P3 at the market variable means, we would find that in
average years the primary producers, as a group, are not attaining their desired
rate of return on investment incorporated into P=ATC. As capacity utilization
increases 5% above the mean and copper stockpiles are lowered 5% below the
mean, market power increases in that P2 rises from .49 to .57. When these
market conditions move 10%, the market power (i.e., P2) increases from .49
-to .64. In 1973, capacity utilization at the full-cost pricing strategy was
94.3%, and primary producers' stocks and government stockpiles of refined
copper were at relatively low historical levels (49,000 and 217,800 short tons,
respectively--see Table 2). In light of the discussion in the paper, market
power should have been quite high in this year. Using the values, P2 = .89
for 1973, P2 was even higher in 1974.
On the other hand, when slack capacity exists and government stockpiles
are high, P3 rises from .51 at the means to .58 at 5% deviation from the
means and to .65 at 10% deviation from the means of the market variables.
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